April 22, 2014 at 12:40 pm (Publications)
I was invited to provide a commentary on Anil Seth’s Cognitive Neuroscience target article “A predictive processing theory of sensorimotor contingencies: Explaining the puzzle of perceptual presence and its absence in synesthesia“. Here it is:
Steps toward an enactive account of synesthesia
Seth extends predictive processing with counterfactuals: Encoded probabilities of what would occur given a repertoire of possible (but unexecuted) actions. He thereby provides a neat mathematical formulation of the sensorimotor account of perceptual presence, i.e., of the fact that we perceive a whole object while being limited to seeing it from a perspective. Synesthetic concurrents are explained in terms of impoverished counterfactuals. I argue that this explanation misses its target, because it only accounts for a lack of objecthood. Enactive theory is better suited to explain concurrents’ lack of subjectivity veridicality. The world itself shapes experience only during veridical perception.
April 21, 2014 at 12:21 pm (Publications)
Tags: embodied cognition, enactive cognitive science, extended cognition, philosophy of mind
I was invited to write a review of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content for The Journal of Mind and Behavior. You can read my largely positive verdict here:
Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2013, 206 pages, $35.00 hardcover
Increasing numbers of philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists are jumping on the embodied cognition bandwagon. Accordingly, mind is no longer viewed as locked away in some Platonic realm of pure logic, as the computational theory of mind has traditionally proposed. Instead, mind has become identified with purposeful activity in the world, an activity that is realized by the body, extended by usage of tools, and scaffolded by a sociocultural environment.
April 7, 2014 at 2:09 pm (Presentations)
I was invited by Joel Parthemore to give a talk during The Second AISB Symposium on Re-Conceptualizing Mental “Illness”: Enactive Philosophy and Cognitive Science – An Ongoing Dialogue, which was held as part of the AISB 2014 Convention at Goldsmiths, University of London, 1-4 April 2013. The title and abstract are:
An Enactive Critique of the Psychopathologies of Cognitive Science
Phenomenology has long pointed to the inadequacy of the mainstream conception of social cognition. While it is correct that we occasionally engage in mindreading, that is, theorizing or simulating other minds in order to predict behavior, the hypothesis that this is the default mode of normal social understanding is phenomenologically unsupported. In this talk I show how phenomenological psychopathology allows us to further extend this critique. It turns out that not only is mindreading not our default mode of social understanding under normal conditions, it is the default mode of social understanding under some psychopathological conditions such as schizophrenia and high-functioning autism. This result has implications for how we understand the social mind in health and disease, and it raises questions about the viability of a mainstream cognitive science that has long theorized about a patently abnormal state of mind as if it were the norm.
This talk was based on the following publication:
Froese, T., Stanghellini, G. & Bertelli, M. O. (2013). Is it normal to be a principal mindreader? Revising theories of social cognition on the basis of schizophrenia and high functioning autism-spectrum disorders. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 34(5): 1376–1387
April 1, 2014 at 2:15 pm (Presentations)
I was invited to give the closing keynote address at the X Congreso Internacional Electrónica y Tecnologías de Avanzada, which was held March 26-28 in Pamplona, Colombia. The title and abstract are as follows:
Engineering new knowledge for the social and cognitive sciences
Dr. Tom Froese
The sciences of man are sharply divided over the role played by sociality. On the one hand, cognitive science tries to reduce all explanations of behavior, including human social behavior, to a single person (and often even to nothing but a single organ: their brain). On the other hand, anthropology and sociology have long insisted that most (if not all) human behavior is an irreducible product of our shared socio-cultural environment. Computer engineering and complex systems theory can help to build a bridge between these two viewpoints. In particular, computer models can be used as formal proofs of concept for the possibility that the individual and the social co-determine each other. In order to illustrate this possibility I will present two case studies that represent two different scales of sociality.
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March 11, 2014 at 12:53 pm (Publications)
More discussion of the role of neural Turing instabilities enabled by unusual disinhibitions of the primary sensory cortex. My colleagues and I respond to commentaries by two cognitive archaeologists, Hodgson and Lewis-Williams, in the latest issue of Adaptive Behavior.
Are altered states of consciousness detrimental, neutral or helpful for the origins of symbolic cognition? A response to Hodgson and Lewis-Williams
Tom Froese, Alexander Woodward and Takashi Ikegami
We respond to the commentaries by Hodgson and Lewis-Williams by clarifying the novelty of our theory. We argue that whenever Turing instabilities of neural activity play a role in generating visual hallucinations, they do more than shape the geometric patterns. Their relatively autonomous self-organization is a source of intrinsic value related to their self-maintenance as a pattern of activity, and they would also thereby decouple “higher-level” stages of neural processing from external stimulation, thus facilitating a more abstract mode of cognition. These additional features of our proposal support Hodgson and Lewis-Williams in their respective theories about the very first origins of human artistic activity. We also evaluate the critical literature regarding the possibility of ritualized enaction of altered states of consciousness (ASC) in early prehistory. We conclude that ASC were indeed possible, and suggest that they were likely involved in facilitating the social development of more symbolic forms of life and mind.
March 2, 2014 at 4:47 pm (Publications)
Tags: biology of cognition, enaction
A couple of years ago John Stewart kindly invited me to be a glossator for his latest book, Questioning Life and Cognition: Some Foundational Issues in the Paradigm of Enaction, published online by Enaction Series: Online Collaborative Publishing.
My comments are interspersed as hyperlinks throughout the book’s text, and in addition I provided an extended epilogue in which I describe John’s influence on my research outlook.
February 18, 2014 at 10:47 am (Publications)
Tags: cognitive science, enactive perception, imitation, phenomenology, primates
After 4 years of effort, my take on comparative psychology has finally been published. Many thanks to my colleague Dave for his expert guidance and endless patience.
The direct perception hypothesis: perceiving the intention of another’s action hinders its precise imitation
Tom Froese and David A. Leavens
We argue that imitation is a learning response to unintelligible actions, especially to social conventions. Various strands of evidence are converging on this conclusion, but further progress has been hampered by an outdated theory of perceptual experience. Comparative psychology continues to be premised on the doctrine that humans and non-human primates only perceive others’ physical “surface behavior,” while mental states are perceptually inaccessible. However, a growing consensus in social cognition research accepts the direct perception hypothesis: primarily we see what others aim to do; we do not infer it from their motions. Indeed, physical details are overlooked – unless the action is unintelligible. On this basis we hypothesize that apes’ propensity to copy the goal of an action, rather than its precise means, is largely dependent on its perceived intelligibility. Conversely, children copy means more often than adults and apes because, uniquely, much adult human behavior is completely unintelligible to unenculturated observers due to the pervasiveness of arbitrary social conventions, as exemplified by customs, rituals, and languages. We expect the propensity to imitate to be inversely correlated with the familiarity of cultural practices, as indexed by age and/or socio-cultural competence. The direct perception hypothesis thereby helps to parsimoniously explain the most important findings of imitation research, including children’s over-imitation and other species-typical and age-related variations.
November 19, 2013 at 1:42 pm (Publications)
I have been invited to become a member of the editorial board of the open-access journal Constructivist Foundations. The latest issue is a collection of papers on the theme of Computational Approaches to Constructivism. I contributed two commentaries:
Ashby’s Passive Contingent Machines Are not Alive: Living Beings Are Actively Goal-directed
Franchi argues that Ashby’s homeostat can be usefully understood as a thought experiment to explore the theory that life is fundamentally heteronomous. While I share Franchi’s interpretation, I disagree that this theory of life is a promising alternative that is at odds with most of the Western philosophical tradition. On the contrary, heteronomy lies at the very core of computationalism, and this is precisely what explains its persistent failure to construct life-like agents.
Tool-use Leads to Bodily Extension, but not Bodily Incorporation: The Limits of Mind-as-it-could-be?
Sato and colleagues make use of an innovative method that combines robotics modeling and psychological experimentation to investigate how tool use affects our living and lived embodiment. I situate their approach in a general shift from robotics to human-computer interface studies in enactive cognitive science, and speculate about the necessary conditions for the bodily incorporation of tools.
November 11, 2013 at 10:44 am (Presentations)
Tags: adaptive behavior, altered states of consciousness, complex systems, cybernetics
Last week I gave a poster presentation during the conference Complejidad y multidisciplina: El Centro de Ciencias de la Complejidad de la UNAM, which took place November 4-6, 2013 at Ciudad Universitaria, Mexico City.
“What doesn’t kill you, makes you stronger” A dynamical systems account by Tom Froese, Carlos Gershenson, and David A. Rosenblueth
I also gave the opening talk of the Segundo Coloquio Internacional de Ciencias Cognitivas, which took place November 7-8, 2013 in Cuernavaca, Mexico.
Can altered states of consciousness be adaptive? Two proofs of concept by Tom Froese
Click on the titles of the presentations for PDFs of the poster and the technical report of the talk.