Commentary on alignment in social interactions

This commentary was just published in Frontiers in Psychology:

Commentary: Alignment in social interactions

Tom Froese and Leonardo Zapata-Fonseca

We welcome Gallotti et al.’s (2017) proposal to shift the study of social cognition from focusing on types of representation to types of interaction. This aligns with the enactive approach to social cognition (e.g., Froese and Di Paolo, 2011), which has long been arguing for this kind of shift (e.g., Varela, 2000; De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). We offer some clarifications from this latter perspective, which will hopefully benefit the development of their proposal.

Seminar on the origins of the genetic code

Next week Jorge and I will give a seminar to report on the work we did during our 2-month stay at the Earth-Life Science Institute:

An iterated learning model of the origin of the genetic code

Tom Froese (National Autonomous University of Mexico, UNAM)
Jorge Campos (National Autonomous University of Mexico, UNAM)

Date: July 25, 2017
Time: 14:00
Room: ELSI-2 Building – ELSI Lounge
Host: Nathaniel Virgo

Theories of the origin of the genetic code take translation for granted and assign an essential role to natural selection and/or mutation of hereditable traits to explain its non-randomness and error robustness. And yet the translation system depends on high fidelity replication. Woese proposed a solution to this fundamental bootstrapping problem by arguing that optimization of the code could have preceded and facilitated evolution of the translation system, and that its evolution was accelerated by communal innovation. He conjectured that early evolution was dominated by horizontal exchange of cellular components among loosely organized protocells rather than by vertical transmission of genetic material, and that lineages of individuals did not exist until after the emergence of the last universal common ancestor. Crucial outstanding problems are clarifying the agency of selection in communal evolution, and verifying whether it provides a rational basis for codon assignments. Here we demonstrate that horizontal transfer of code fragments can in principle give rise to key properties of the genetic code. In accordance with Woese’s claim that the dynamic of communal evolution is primarily determined by the organization of the recipient cell, and taking inspiration from comparisons between the advent of the genetic code and the emergence of human language, we created an iterated learning model of a group of protocells. Previous models of the origin of the genetic code have reproduced its regularity and optimality as well as its universality, but this is the first model to reproduce these features without vertical descent. This proof of concept suggests another modality of evolution: not only was Darwinian evolution (dominated by vertical transmission of genes) arguably preceded by Lamarckian evolution (vertical transmission with heredity of acquired traits), the latter was possibly preceded by Woesian evolution (dominated by horizontal acquisition).

Black box

Chapter for OUP Handbook of 4E Cognition

Here is a pre-print version of my contribution to The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition, edited by Newen, de Bruin, and Gallagher.

Searching for the conditions of genuine intersubjectivity: From agent-based models to perceptual crossing experiments

Tom Froese

Enactivists are searching for the conditions of genuine intersubjectivity. Theory of mind approaches to social cognition have come a long way from folk psychological theorizing by paying more attention to neuroscientific evidence and phenomenological insights. This has led to hybrid accounts that incorporate automatic processing and allow an instrumental role for perception and interaction. However, two foundational assumptions remain unquestioned. First, the cognitive unconscious: explanations assume there is a privileged domain of subpersonal mechanisms that operate in terms of representational personal-level concepts (belief, desire, inference, pretense, etc.), albeit unconsciously. Second, methodological individualism: explanations of social capacities are limited to mechanisms contained within the individual. The enactive approach breaks free from these representationalist-internalist constraints by integrating personal-level phenomenology with multi-scale dynamics occurring within and between subjects. This formal and empirical research on social interaction supports the possibility of genuine intersubjectivity: we can directly participate in the unfolding of each other’s experience.

Workshop on distributed cognition

Today and on Wednesday there will be a Workshop on Distributed Cognition taking place at the Earth-Life Science Institute (ELSI) in Tokyo. The workshop is organized by the ELSI Origins Network.

I was invited to give a talk and my contribution will be on “distributed memory”, based on the talk I recently gave at the conference on Formation of Embodied Memory in Heidelberg.

Research page updated

I finally found some time to update the research page of my website. Here is the opening paragraph:

I am a cognitive scientist interested in understanding the complexities of the human mind on the basis of embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive approaches to cognition (so called “4E cognition”). For me this means systematically investigating how our minds are shaped by being alive, by being sensorimotor animals, and by us leading socially, technologically, and culturally constituted ways of life (Froese and Di Paolo 2011; Torrance and Froese 2011). One of the most promising approaches to better appreciate the role these different facets can play is to try to understand their origins and the qualitative changes their appearance implies.

The rest can be found here on the research page.

EON Long-Term-Visitor Award

logoI have received an EON Long-Term-Visitor Award from the director of the Earth-Life Science Institute (ELSI) of the Tokyo Institute of Technology to work for two months (June and July 2017) with Dr. Virgo and his colleagues of the ELSI Origins Network (EON).

The aim is to create an agent-based model of the origins of the genetic code based on the mechanism of horizontal gene transmission. The model is inspired by the iterated learning model of the evolution of language.

Symposium on Hallucinations and Perceptual Experience

I’ve been invited to give a talk at a Symposium on Hallucinations and Perceptual Experience, which Prof. Juan Gonzalez has organized in the context of the Second International Conference of Transdisciplinary Research in the Social Sciences and Humanities.

The event will start tomorrow at 10:00 in Cuernavaca, Mexico.

The line-up is as follows:

Prof. Juan Gonzalez (speaker)
Prof. Jose Luis Diaz (speaker)
Dr. Tom Froese (speaker)
Dr. Glenda Satne (discussant)

The title of my contribution is: “Hallucinations: internal fictions, external realities, or something in-between?” (Alucinaciones: ¿ficciones internas, realidades externas o algo intermedio?).

Video: Introduction to enactive cognitive science

A video of my talk for the Society for Cognitive Science and Philosophy (SCSP) has been made available online with accompanying slides. The recording was made on Feb. 26, 2016, at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic.

The tile is “Introduction to enactive cognitive science”.


https://slideslive.com/38895918/introduction-to-enactive-cognitive-science

tom

Article in support of life-mind continuity

Prof. Dr. Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic and Dr. Robert Lowe guest-edited a special issue of the journal Entropy on the topic “Information-Processing and Embodied, Embedded, Enactive Cognition” to which I contributed an article with Michael Kirchhoff.

Where There is Life There is Mind: In Support of a Strong Life-Mind Continuity Thesis

Michael D. Kirchhoff and Tom Froese

This paper considers questions about continuity and discontinuity between life and mind. It begins by examining such questions from the perspective of the free energy principle (FEP). The FEP is becoming increasingly influential in neuroscience and cognitive science. It says that organisms act to maintain themselves in their expected biological and cognitive states, and that they can do so only by minimizing their free energy given that the long-term average of free energy is entropy. The paper then argues that there is no singular interpretation of the FEP for thinking about the relation between life and mind. Some FEP formulations express what we call an independence view of life and mind. One independence view is a cognitivist view of the FEP. It turns on information processing with semantic content, thus restricting the range of systems capable of exhibiting mentality. Other independence views exemplify what we call an overly generous non-cognitivist view of the FEP, and these appear to go in the opposite direction. That is, they imply that mentality is nearly everywhere. The paper proceeds to argue that non-cognitivist FEP, and its implications for thinking about the relation between life and mind, can be usefully constrained by key ideas in recent enactive approaches to cognitive science. We conclude that the most compelling account of the relationship between life and mind treats them as strongly continuous, and that this continuity is based on particular concepts of life (autopoiesis and adaptivity) and mind (basic and non-semantic).

Seminar on the origins of the symbolic mind

I was invited to give a talk at UNAM’s Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas this Wednesday as part of the Rationality, Reasoning, and Cognition seminar series. The title of my contribution is “How did humans overcome the cognitive gap? On the origins of the symbolic mind”. Details in the flyer below:

Froese_Seminar_at_IIF_19-04-17.jpg

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