Philosophy events at UOW

Today we will have a workshop on “The Origins and Nature of Contentful Minds: Continuity, Transformation, Integration?” in the University of Wollong’s Research Hub, Building 19 – Room 2072. The program can be downloaded here.

My contribution is entitled: “Does the evolved apprentice model remain in the zone of latent solutions?”

Then from Wednesday to Friday there will be the 2016 UOW Philosophy Training Conference, where I will give an invited talk with the title “Hallucinations: Inner fictions, outer realities, or something in between?”

Workshop on Narrative Therapy and Cultural Affordances

Here is information about this Friday’s little workshop:

Workshop on Narrative Therapy and Cultural Affordances

Friday 25th November 2016
Northfield’s Campus, University of Wollongong
14:00-18:00, Room 19.G015, Building 19

Narrative therapy is based on the premise that people are the experts of their own lives, and that they have skills, beliefs, and values that will assist them to reduce the influence of problems. As its name suggests, this approach emphasizes the therapeutic potential of the stories that people narrate about their lives. In particular, its efficacy is assumed to reside in the differences that can be made through particular tellings and retellings, which involves finding ways of understanding the stories, and ways of re-authoring them in collaboration with the therapist.

This workshop will evaluate narrative therapy from a philosophical perspective. In particular, the aim is to discuss whether the narrative practice hypothesis about folk psychology could help to shed light on narrative therapy and its efficacy. Particular emphasis will be given to discuss the potential role of reshaping one’s culturally mediated affordances for action.

Speakers:

Daniel D. Hutto, Professor of Philosophical Psychology, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, UOW
Tom Froese, Vice Chancellor’s International Scholar, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, UOW & Research Institute for Applied Mathematics and Systems, National Autonomous University of Mexico
Glenda Satne, Vice Chancellor’s Fellow, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, UOW
Nicolle Brancazio and Jarrah Aubourg, Doctoral Candidates, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, UOW
Miguel Segundo Ortin, Doctoral Candidate, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, UOW
Farid Zahnoun, Visiting Doctoral Candidate, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, UOW & Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp.

All welcome.

Workshop on the origins of the symbolic mind

Please see information about this week’s workshop below:

Workshop on the origins of the symbolic mind

Wednesday 16th November 2016
Northfield’s Campus, University of Wollongong
14:00-18:00, Research Hub (19.2072), Building 19

Dates for the first appearances of crucial technological innovations and symbolic material culture are continually being pushed back in time. This trend contradicts the theory that a mutation related to brain function caused a sudden and relatively recent cognitive revolution in our lineage. However, the alternative theory of gradual biological evolution may not fit the archaeological record, either. Traditions within populations are discontinuous in time and space, while independent populations can converge on common practices. Accordingly, there is a growing consensus that changes in the archaeological record of human behavior are better explained by changes in local conditions, such as ecology, demography, and culture.

What does this consensus tell us about the origins of symbolic cognition? Given increasingly older dates for key innovations and the shift in explanatory focus from internal biology to external factors, the mainstream argument is that cognitive modernity must be much older than previously thought. The workshop will critically evaluate the assumed identification of biological continuity with cognitive continuity. It will also consider to what extent cognitive capacities are innate and context independent, and will explore the tensions between such a nativist theory of cognition and recent developments in cognitive science, which emphasize that cognition is scaffolded, extended, and even constituted by behavioral practices. Contributions to this workshop will consider possible explanations of distinctive features of symbolic minds – explanations that may depend not only or mainly on having the right kind of biological capacities but more pivotally on transforming them via interaction with the appropriate culturally created local conditions.

This workshop brings together archaeologists and philosophers working at the University of Wollongong (UOW) to explore the implications of these developments for cognitive archaeology and for cognitive science more generally.

Speakers:

Alex Mackay, Senior Lecturer, ARC DECRA Fellow, Centre for Archaeological Science, UOW
Sam Lin, Lecturer, Centre for Archaeological Science, UOW
Zenobia Jacobs, Professor, ARC QEII Research Fellow, Centre for Archaeological Science, UOW
Tom Froese, Vice Chancellor’s International Scholar, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, UOW
Daniel D. Hutto, Professor of Philosophical Psychology, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, UOW

All welcome.

Talk on genuine intersubjectivity at UOW, Australia

I was awarded a Vice-Chancellor’s International Scholar Award to come to the University of Wollongong in Australia from Oct 3 to Dec 3 this year. The aim of my visit is to integrate Dan Hutto and his group’s work on radical enactive philosophy of mind at the School of Humanities and Social Inquiry with the empirical work on the earliest symbolic expressions conducted by members of the university’s Center for Archaeological Science.

As part of my stay here I am scheduled to give a public seminar on my research into social interaction. Here is the announcement:

Title/Topic: When me and you are more than two: Searching for the conditions of genuine intersubjectivity
Speaker: Dr. Tom Froese (National Autonomous University of Mexico; UOW VISA Fellow)
Time: 3.30 to 5.00pm
Place: 19.2072 (Research Hub)
Contact: Michael Kirchhoff (kirchhof@uow.edu.au)

Abstract: The most meaningful experiences in our lives derive much of their significance from being shared with other people. However, is it actually possible to share a moment such that there are two subjects of one experience? Mainstream cognitive science is forced to reject this possibility of genuine intersubjectivity because another person can only play an instrumental role in the generation of one’s experience. Essentially, our experiences with family, friends, and loved ones do not involve them at all; these experiences are ultimately constituted by mental representations in one’s mind for which they can, at best, serve as an external cause or trigger. In this talk I question the validity of this solipsistic approach. Drawing on insights from dynamical systems modeling, I consider the basic conditions that would allow interacting individuals to become transformed into one integrated system with collective properties. I then present the latest evidence from psychological experiments that investigate the role that social interaction plays in shaping our awareness of other minds. I conclude that there is nothing mysterious about the possibility of genuine intersubjectivity.

Understanding complexity

posterThe prestigious Colegio Nacional of Mexico is holding a two-day event on complexity and interdisciplinarity “Entendiendo la complejidad: La multidisciplina en las ciencias“, September 27-28.

The event is open to the public and will be broadcast live.

I was invited to give a talk about my research as a member of the Centro de Ciencias de la Complejidad.

The title of my talk is “La organización política de Teotihuacan como sistema complejo”, and is scheduled to start tomorrow at 18:15.

The full program can be found here.

Chapter on the enactive philosophy of embodiment

imagesMog Stapleton and I collaborated on a chapter that has just been published by Springer in Biology and Subjectivity: Philosophical Contributions to Non-reductive Neuroscience, edited by García-Valdecasas, Murillo, and Barrett.

The enactive philosophy of embodiment: From biological foundations of agency to the phenomenology of subjectivity

Mog Stapleton and Tom Froese

Following on from the philosophy of embodiment by Merleau-Ponty, Jonas and others, enactivism is a pivot point from which various areas of science can be brought into a fruitful dialogue about the nature of subjectivity. In this chapter we present the enactive conception of agency, which, in contrast to current mainstream theories of agency, is deeply and strongly embodied. In line with this thinking we argue that anything that ought to be considered a genuine agent is a biologically embodied (even if distributed) agent, and that this embodiment must be affectively lived. However, we also consider that such an affective agent is not necessarily also an agent imbued with an explicit sense of subjectivity. To support this contention we outline the interoceptive foundation of basic agency and argue that there is a qualitative difference in the phenomenology of agency when it is instantiated in organisms which, due to their complexity and size, require a nervous system to underpin their physiological and sensorimotor processes. We argue that this interoceptively grounded agency not only entails affectivity but also forms the necessary basis for subjectivity.

Interview on TV UNAM

Yesterday TV UNAM broadcast a conversation I had with Ezequiel Di Paolo during his recent visit to Mexico. It was shown in the context of a program called “Entrevistas (Im)posibles” and was entitled “Cerebro y Vida Artificial”.

The video of the interview is available online:

Video memory of ALIFE XV in Cancun

Some impressions from this year’s International Conference on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems (ALIFE XV).

Launch of research group website

Since the beginning of last year I have been involved in the formation of a new research group dedicated to 4E cognition. We have finally launched our own website. Please click on the following link to know more about us:

http://4ecognitiongroup.wordpress.com

 

International workshop on hallucinations

I was invited to give a talk at an international workshop on hallucinations, organized by Juan Gonzalez, at the Faculty of Humanities, UAEM, Cuernavaca.

Hallucinations: Inner fictions, outer realities, or something in between?

Tom Froese

Despite its stated intentions to the contrary, enactivist epistemology, especially in its early formulations, implicitly assumed the same kind of internalism about conscious experience that is inherent in the majority of approaches to cognitive science. On this view, there is no essential difference between a perceptual and a hallucinatory experience – at least not from the point of view of the subject. The difference lies in the external reality to which there is no access. More recently, enactivist epistemology has started to explicitly reject this view of consciousness in favor of a relational concept of consciousness, in which not only the brain but also body and environment shape our experiences. This view has the interesting consequence that perceptual and hallucinatory experience should in principle be phenomenologically distinguishable based on the status of the environment in relation to what is experienced. Conversely, a transformation of the subjective pole of this distributed subject-world relationship, for example during altered states of consciousness, would no longer be just internal and self-contained. In some cases it could therefore reveal otherwise hidden aspects of reality, which might be consistent with some shamanic interpretations of hallucinations.

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