Keynote at From Animals to Animats 15 (SAB 2018)

I will be a keynote speaker at FROM ANIMALS TO ANIMATS 15: The 15th International Conference on the Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (SAB 2018), which will take place 14-17 August 2018, in Frankfurt, Germany, and is organized by the International Society for Adaptive Behavior (ISAB).

Here is my title and abstract:

Searching for the conditions of genuine intersubjectivity: From robotics to HCI

Tom Froese

Many our most valued experiences are experiences that we share with others. Yet the basis for this sense of we-ness remains mysterious. Could it really be possible that two people share one and the same experience? How so? Two lines of research are providing important insights. First, complex systems analyses of social robotics and agent-based models have demonstrated that there is nothing mysterious about the possibility of cognitive activity being distributed in a multi-agent system. Second, experimental investigations of real-time embodied social interaction mediated by human-computer interfaces demonstrate that co-regulation of interaction dynamics makes a difference to experience. This formal and empirical research on social interaction supports the possibility of genuine intersubjectivity: we can directly participate in the unfolding of each other’s experience.

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The 2nd Week on Complexity Sciences at C3-UNAM

The 2nd Week on Complexity Sciences will be held at the Center for Complexity Sciences (C3) at UNAM’s main campus from Jan. 31 to Feb 2. There will be many international invited speakers.

I will give a talk on the recent work I did with Prof. Alejandro Frank on the origins of the genetic code on Jan. 31 at 13:00. The title of our contribution is “A new approach to the origin of the genetic code”.

Keynote at the 3rd Joint UAE Symposium on Social Robotics

The 3rd Joint UAE Symposium on Social Robotics will be hosted by the United Arab Emirates University and New York University Abu Dhabi during 4-7 February.

The title and abstract of my keynote lecture are as follows:

Searching for the conditions of genuine intersubjectivity: From robotics to HCI

Tom Froese

Many our most valued experiences are experiences that we share with others. Yet the basis for this sense of we-ness remains mysterious. Could it really be possible that two people share one and the same experience? How so? I will argue that enactivists are starting to identify the conditions of this kind of genuine intersubjectivity. To be fair, theory of mind approaches to social cognition have also come a long way from folk psychological theorizing by paying more attention to neuroscientific evidence and phenomenological insights. This has led to hybrid accounts that incorporate automatic processing and allow an instrumental role for perception and interaction. However, two foundational assumptions remain unquestioned.

First, the cognitive unconscious: explanations assume there is a privileged domain of sub-personal mechanisms that operate in terms of representational personal-level concepts (belief, desire, inference, pretense, etc.), albeit unconsciously. Second, methodological individualism: such explanations of social capacities are limited to mechanisms contained within the individual.

The enactive approach has broken free from these representationalist-internalist conceptual constraints by directly integrating personal-level phenomenology with multi-scale dynamics occurring within and between subjects. Complex systems analyses of social robotics and agent-based models have demonstrated that there is nothing mysterious about the possibility of cognitive activity being distributed in a multi-agent system. Experimental investigations of real-time embodied social interaction mediated by human-computer interfaces demonstrate that co-regulation of interaction dynamics makes a difference to experience. This formal and empirical research on social interaction supports the possibility of genuine intersubjectivity: we can directly participate in the unfolding of each other’s experience.

NEW PAPER MODELING REFERENTIAL COMMUNICATION

This minimal cognition model will be useful in the philosophical debate regarding the widely assumed necessity of understanding bee dance in a representational way…

4E Cognition Group

Referential communication as a collective property of a brain-body-environment-body-brain system: A minimal cognitive model

Jorge I. Campos and Tom Froese

Referential communication is a complex form of social interaction whereby agents manage to coordinate behavior with respect to features that are not immediately present during the interaction. A famous example from nature is the bee waggle dance. The authors used an minimal cognitive approach to create a model of referential communication that is sufficiently minimal to permit a full dynamical analysis, and yet still complex enough so that the results provide a useful perspective onto the processes that could be involved in natural referential communication. The task is for two embodied agents to interact in a “hive” area such that one of the agents (the receiver) is able to move to a specific “target”, the location of which is only available to the other agent (the sender). The task…

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Talk on the social brain hypothesis in fish

Tomorrow there will be a workshop at the Merida site of the Institute for Applied Mathematics and Systems Research. The topic is “La Computación y las Matemáticas Aplicadas para Resolver Problemas en la Ciencia”.

I was invited to give a talk and will present “The social brain hypothesis in fish: A big data approach”.

Here is the program of the event:

6th Roundtable Teotihuacan

Today started the 6th Roundtable of Teotihuacan, which will take place in Teotihuacan during Nov. 16-18, 2017.

There is live transmission of the main talks: http://www.inah.gob.mx/es/mesa-teotihuacan-programa

The title and abstract of my talk are as follows:

Explorando la función del posible cogobierno de distritos con base en un modelo matemático de su red social

Dr. Tom Froese y Dra. Linda R. Manzanilla
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Is there room for normativity in a dynamical world?

Tomorrow at 2pm I will be giving an online talk for the ENactive Seminars Online (ENSO) Series. Here are the title and abstract:

Is there room for normativity in a dynamical world?

Enactivism rejects the standard working hypothesis of cognitive science, according to which all cognition involves the unconscious manipulation of mental representations, and replaces it with a dynamical systems account. And yet enactivism resists other, purely dynamical approaches that see no role for any kind of subjectivity, because it appeals to the role of our lived phenomenology and claims that living beings behave with respect to norms directed at maintaining their viability.

So far, this middle way seems to be philosophically unsatisfactory: at best it allows us to claim that acting in accordance with experience or norms just is a certain kind of dynamic pattern. But this turns subjectivity into a mysterious difference that makes no difference as such with respect to the unfolding of those patterns, which is completely determined by the dynamics alone.

This calls for deeper philosophical reflection about how it is possible for subjectivity to play a role in an objective world while avoiding a regression to the untenable positions of either representationalism or eliminativism.

Watch the seminar live: http://www.ensoseminars.com/presentations/past17/

Collective origins of the genetic code

Later today I am giving the weekly colloquium at the Center for Complexity Sciences (C3) at our main campus of UNAM. The topic will be our ongoing work on a simulation model of the collective origins of the genetic code. Details of the colloquium below:

Cartel_Coloquio C3_07-1

Measuring the role of passive touch in social perception

We were able to demonstrate that we have the clearest awareness of the presence of another person when we feel them touching us. This conclusion is perhaps not entirely unexpected, but it is nice because it is the first time that the notion of passive touch, which was developed by phenomenological philosophy and developmental psychology, has been empirically measured and quantified.

A Sensorimotor Signature of the Transition to Conscious Social Perception: Co-regulation of Active and Passive Touch

Hiroki Kojima, Tom Froese, Mizuki Oka, Hiroyuki Iizuka, and Takashi Ikegami

It is not yet well understood how we become conscious of the presence of other people as being other subjects in their own right. Developmental and phenomenological approaches are converging on a relational hypothesis: my perception of a “you” is primarily constituted by another subject’s attention being directed toward “me.” This is particularly the case when my body is being physically explored in an intentional manner. We set out to characterize the sensorimotor signature of the transition to being aware of the other by re-analyzing time series of embodied interactions between pairs of adults (recorded during a “perceptual crossing” experiment). Measures of turn-taking and movement synchrony were used to quantify social coordination, and transfer entropy was used to quantify direction of influence. We found that the transition leading to one’s conscious perception of the other’s presence was indeed characterized by a significant increase in one’s passive reception of the other’s tactile stimulations. Unexpectedly, one’s clear experience of such passive touch was consistently followed by a switch to active touching of the other, while the other correspondingly became more passive, which suggests that this intersubjective experience was reciprocally co-regulated by both participants.

Kojima et al. 2017 - Figure 8

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