I was invited by Joel Parthemore to give a talk during The Second AISB Symposium on Re-Conceptualizing Mental “Illness”: Enactive Philosophy and Cognitive Science – An Ongoing Dialogue, which was held as part of the AISB 2014 Convention at Goldsmiths, University of London, 1-4 April 2013. The title and abstract are:
An Enactive Critique of the Psychopathologies of Cognitive Science
Phenomenology has long pointed to the inadequacy of the mainstream conception of social cognition. While it is correct that we occasionally engage in mindreading, that is, theorizing or simulating other minds in order to predict behavior, the hypothesis that this is the default mode of normal social understanding is phenomenologically unsupported. In this talk I show how phenomenological psychopathology allows us to further extend this critique. It turns out that not only is mindreading not our default mode of social understanding under normal conditions, it is the default mode of social understanding under some psychopathological conditions such as schizophrenia and high-functioning autism. This result has implications for how we understand the social mind in health and disease, and it raises questions about the viability of a mainstream cognitive science that has long theorized about a patently abnormal state of mind as if it were the norm.
This talk was based on the following publication:
Froese, T., Stanghellini, G. & Bertelli, M. O. (2013). Is it normal to be a principal mindreader? Revising theories of social cognition on the basis of schizophrenia and high functioning autism-spectrum disorders. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 34(5): 1376–1387