I was invited to give a talk at an international workshop on hallucinations, organized by Juan Gonzalez, at the Faculty of Humanities, UAEM, Cuernavaca.
Hallucinations: Inner fictions, outer realities, or something in between?
Despite its stated intentions to the contrary, enactivist epistemology, especially in its early formulations, implicitly assumed the same kind of internalism about conscious experience that is inherent in the majority of approaches to cognitive science. On this view, there is no essential difference between a perceptual and a hallucinatory experience – at least not from the point of view of the subject. The difference lies in the external reality to which there is no access. More recently, enactivist epistemology has started to explicitly reject this view of consciousness in favor of a relational concept of consciousness, in which not only the brain but also body and environment shape our experiences. This view has the interesting consequence that perceptual and hallucinatory experience should in principle be phenomenologically distinguishable based on the status of the environment in relation to what is experienced. Conversely, a transformation of the subjective pole of this distributed subject-world relationship, for example during altered states of consciousness, would no longer be just internal and self-contained. In some cases it could therefore reveal otherwise hidden aspects of reality, which might be consistent with some shamanic interpretations of hallucinations.