Symposium on Hallucinations and Perceptual Experience

I’ve been invited to give a talk at a Symposium on Hallucinations and Perceptual Experience, which Prof. Juan Gonzalez has organized in the context of the Second International Conference of Transdisciplinary Research in the Social Sciences and Humanities.

The event will start tomorrow at 10:00 in Cuernavaca, Mexico.

The line-up is as follows:

Prof. Juan Gonzalez (speaker)
Prof. Jose Luis Diaz (speaker)
Dr. Tom Froese (speaker)
Dr. Glenda Satne (discussant)

The title of my contribution is: “Hallucinations: internal fictions, external realities, or something in-between?” (Alucinaciones: ¿ficciones internas, realidades externas o algo intermedio?).

Video: Introduction to enactive cognitive science

A video of my talk for the Society for Cognitive Science and Philosophy (SCSP) has been made available online with accompanying slides. The recording was made on Feb. 26, 2016, at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic.

The tile is “Introduction to enactive cognitive science”.


Special issue has been released!

It’s been a long time in the making, but finally it has come out: a special issue of Constructivist Foundations dedicated to a comprehensive reflection on the relationships between enaction and other alternative approaches to cognitive science! It is the biggest issue of the journal yet.

For a small donation you can get a print version of the special issue delivered to you! Please help to support this free online journal. Click the link for details:


Workshops at Artificial Life 2016

In addition to helping to organize this year’s International Conference on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems (ALIFE 2016), I am contributing to the organization of two associated workshops. Here are the calls for abstracts.

The Biological Foundations of Enactivism

The workshop will bring together researchers in enactive cognition, computational modeling, biology, and philosophy, to discuss the biological foundations of enactivism. Of particular interest are issues related to the maintenance of autonomous systems, and the origins of autonomous systems.

Submissions to the workshop are extended abstracts (1 or 2 pages). Contributions may be original or previously published. Accepted abstracts will be put online. Authors of accepted submissions will present their project to the workshop in a 5-10 minute talk.

Submission deadline is May 13, 2016.

Multidisciplinary Applications of Evolutionary Game Theory

Evolutionary game theory is profoundly interdisciplinary and the flow of knowledge between different fields is of crucial importance for its future development and application. The goal of the workshop is to show the state-of-the-art of the field and connect researchers with different backgrounds, from physicists and computer scientists to economists and sociologists and invite them to share ideas and learn from each other.

We invite the submission of 1- to 4-page abstracts (Alife conference format). Contributions will be evaluated on their merit for presentation. After the workshop, the most relevant contributions will be invited to provide an extended manuscript for a special issue on evolutionary game theory in the Artificial Life journal (MIT Press).

The deadline for the submission of abstracts is April 17th, 2016.

Book presentation of “Making sense of non-sense”

PRESENTACION DE LIBROWe finally organized a meeting to present the edited book “Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making: Making Sense of Non-Sense“.

When: 12:00, Nov. 26, 2015
Where: Auditorio César Carrizales, UAEM campus, Cuernavaca, Mexico

We will have one editor (Tom Froese), two authors (Juan Gonzalez and Dobromir Dotov), and several commentators (José Luis Díaz and others) presenting their views.

Attendees will be able to take advantage of a special discount to order their copy of the book from Palgrave Macmillan.

The attentive brain, the deluded brain – what is reality?

AFFICHE_Reality_11_2015_V7_Oct_3Next week there will be a conference entitled “The attentive brain, the deluded brain – what is reality?” taking place from Nov. 4-7 in Mittelwihr, France.

The organizers encourage attendants to think out of the box and discover new horizons at the cross-roads of science and meditation.

I have been invited as a keynote speaker and workshop contributor. The title and abstract of my main contribution are as follows:

How isolated are we really? Toward a science of being-with others

Tom Froese

Traditional cognitive science has approached the phenomenon of understanding others in terms of a Theory of Mind framework. This framework was originally proposed to overcome the problems raised by a pair of seemingly self-evident assumptions: 1) mind is a property of an isolated brain, 2) a person’s mind, like their brain, is therefore completely hidden from the perceptual perspective of others. If so, then any scientific theory of social understanding must explain how one individual’s internal mechanism can infer meaning from another individual’s meaningless external physical movements. I will try to demonstrate that this is a misguided explanatory project for several reasons. When we interact with others we normally do not perceive them as mindless zombies, nor is our mind isolated from them. Therefore, what is needed is a scientific theory that can do justice to the perceptual presence of others and our mental interconnectedness.

Commentary on The Cognitive-Emotional Brain

Pessoa2013One of the next issues of Behavioral and Brain Sciences will include a discussion of Pessoa’s (2013) book The Cognitive-Emotional Brain: From Interactions to Integration by MIT Press. I wrote the following short piece as part of the peer commentary that will be published with Pessoa’s précis.

Enactive neuroscience, the direct perception hypothesis, and the socially extended mind

Tom Froese

Pessoa’s The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (2013) is an integrative approach to neuroscience that complements other developments in cognitive science, especially enactivism. Both accept complexity as essential to mind; both tightly integrate perception, cognition, and emotion, which enactivism unifies in its foundational concept of sense-making; and both emphasize that the spatial extension of mental processes is not reducible to specific brain regions and neuroanatomical connectivity. An enactive neuroscience is emerging.

Talks at AISB 2015

I am giving two invited talks at this year’s meeting of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behavior (AISB 2015), which is being held in Canterbury, April 20-22. Titles and short abstracts are as follows:

The enactive theory of social cognition: From theory to experiment

Tom Froese

For over a decade I have been working on applying an evolutionary robotics approach to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of social interaction. At the same time I have been developing the enactive theory of social cognition by drawing on the phenomenological philosophy of intersubjectivity. Recently I was able to test the predictions deriving from this research on the basis of a psychological experiment using a new variation of the perceptual crossing paradigm. The empirical results support a genuinely enactive conception of social cognition as primarily grounded in embodied intersubjectivity.

The behavior-based origin of life and the problem of genetic representation

Tom Froese

Traditionally, there has been a dispute about whether metabolism or replication came first during the origin of life. While the metabolism-first approach focuses on chemical self-constitution of an individual, the replicator-first approach focuses on generational self-replication of a population of informational molecules. Yet both implicitly agree that the first forms of life were isolated, passive, and static individuals. Both ignore the intermediate timescales of activity between chemical self-constitution and population evolution: no mention is made of behavior and development. These assumptions are challenged by a new generation of metabolism-first approaches, which emphasize that movement and adaptive behavior could have played an important role right from the start. I consider how this behavior-based approach to the origin of life can inform our thinking about a number of traditional problems.
Read the rest of this entry »

Review of Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content

I was invited to write a review of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content for The Journal of Mind and Behavior. You can read my largely positive verdict here:

Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2013, 206 pages, $35.00 hardcover

Tom Froese

Increasing numbers of philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists are jumping on the embodied cognition bandwagon. Accordingly, mind is no longer viewed as locked away in some Platonic realm of pure logic, as the computational theory of mind has traditionally proposed. Instead, mind has become identified with purposeful activity in the world, an activity that is realized by the body, extended by usage of tools, and scaffolded by a sociocultural environment.